Abstract: Utilizing the comparative approach of transaction cost economics (TCE), this paper contributes to the developing knowledge-based theory (KBV) of governance choice. We provide justification for the importance of organizational alignment in the development of knowledge-based assets. We argue that particular knowledge-based competencies and modes of organization are advantaged in solving different kinds of problems related to development, relative to other organizational modes. We then undertake a comparative empirical examination of development performance, using pharmaceutical drug development as the empirical setting. A number of insights around the importance and interaction of experience, technological complexity and organization in development are found. The paper thus adds to literature that examines knowledge development and its implications for organization and performance in R&D-intensive settings.
INTRODUCTION
The knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm documents and attempts to explain the role of knowledge in differentiating firm performance (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996b; Kogut & Zander, 1996) . This perspective maintains that firms create competitive advantage through a cumulative activity of exploitation (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991) , experiential learning and expertise (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Leonard-Barton, 1992) , and idiosyncratic routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) . Superior performance and competitive advantage results from the informational advantages and reductions in uncertainty brought on from the greater knowledge that exists within the firm. More recent research has begun to examine how the choice of organization influences the efficiency and protection of knowledge development and transfer (Conner, 1991; Conner et al., 1996; Demsetz, 1988; Grant, 1996b; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Kogut et al., 1996; Monteverde, 1995) . Relatively under explored in this literature is a comparison of the knowledge-based advantages and disadvantages of market versus hierarchical modes of organization.
Utilizing the comparative approach of transaction cost economics (TCE), we contribute to the developing knowledge-based theory (KBV) of governance choice. We examine two theoretical and empirical issues pertinent to the organization of technological development. The first is the extent to which development performance differs across firms; the second is the degree to which organizationallevel factors related to knowledge development account for these performance differences. We provide theoretical justification and empirical support for the importance of organizational alignment in the development of knowledge-based assets (Macher, 2004; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004) . Our main contribution is that certain modes of organization are advantaged in solving different kinds of problems related to technological development, relative to other organizational modes.
Firms with more internally-based experience achieve superior development performance, while firms with more externally-based experience competencies do not. We also find that the complexity of technological development and how firms organize to solve problems associated with this complexity have significant effects on performance. Firms that outsource development that is more scientifically novel have significantly worse performance than firms who keep this type of development internal. As the knowledge and scientific understanding surrounding novel development is not well documented and less established in the public domain , the coordinative requirements of such undertakings are more easily facilitated within a given firm than between firms. At the same time, however, technological development that is not leading-edge achieves superior performance when outsourced due to the high powered incentives of market-based settings. Our findings thus suggest that the technological requirements of development have important implications on make versus buy decisions.
Using pharmaceutical drug development as our empirical setting, w e make a number of contributions to the KBV literature. We employ a host of novel firm-level measures for knowledge, and in so doing add to empirical research that examines the role that "knowledge competencies" play in differentiating firm performance. We also add to empirical research that examines the performance implications of alternative modes of organization (Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002; Macher, 2004; Masten, Meehan, & Snyder, 1991; Poppo & Zenger, 1998) , and especially the developing knowledge based view (KBV) of governance choice. Our results suggest that firms align the organization of development activities with the particular requirements of the technology under development in order to facilitate problem identification and improve performance. Finally, we examine an area of R&D activity-pharmaceutical drug development-that h as received more limited scholarly attention in comparison to research that examines pharmaceutical research. Nevertheless, drug development costs often exceed those of drug research, and are cited as a primary rationale for vertical and horizontal mergers in the pharmaceutical industry. Understanding the organizational implications of knowledge is of critical strategic importance to managers within this and other similar industries.
The next section of the paper highlights aspects of transaction cost economics (TCE) and the knowledge based view (KBV) that are pertinent to explaining performance differences. Section 3 sets the empirical context, highlighting the distinction between drug discovery and drug development, the pharmaceutical industry's evolving organization, and the increasingly important role of Contract Research Organizations (CROs) in drug development. Section 4 discusses the data and variables, while Section 5 presents and discusses the results, economic significance and limitations of the econometric analysis.
Section 6 makes concluding comments.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The developing knowledge-based view (KBV) of governance choice has predominantly underscored the virtues of hierarchy in facilitating knowledge exchange. Hierarchy is argued beneficial on the one hand due to its ability to avoid knowledge transfer by exercising authority and directing the actions of others (Conner, 1991; Conner et al., 1996; Demsetz, 1988) . This form of organization is argued advantageous on the other hand due to its ability to facilitate knowledge transfer through established communication channels and codes, shared knowledge and languages, and routines (Grant, 1996b; Kogut et al., 1992 Kogut et al., , 1996 Monteverde, 1995) . These knowledge-based arguments promote the advantages of hierarchies over market modes of organization despite their inefficiencies for certain types of knowledge development problems (Nickerson et al., 2004) . For instance, hierarchies likely slow the speed of problem solving in comparison to market modes for knowledge that is easily decomposable either between two parties or across successive stages of a value chain due to more limited expertise (Hammond & Miller, 1985) , lower powered incentives or more centralized decision-making (Williamson, 1991) . By contrast, knowledge development that is non-decomposable or requires significant interaction between two parties or across production stages most likely benefits within a firm due to superior control and coordination features. The firm-specific languages, information channels and incentive and dispute resolution mechanisms of hierarchies encourage knowledge sharing, facilitate communication, and promote greater coordination (Kogut et al., 1996) .
Transaction cost economics (TCE) argues that firms' integration decisions are based on a comparison of the performance of alternative modes of organization. In particular, firms improve performance by aligning transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which vary in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating and economizing way (Williamson, 1991) . Firms that do not appropriately align transactions with governance structures are presumed to suffer performance consequences. Applying this line of reasoning to the KBV would contend that firms who seek to economize on knowledge development should align knowledge-based assets, which differ in distinct features, with organizational structures that possess particular knowledge-based competencies and costs (Nickerson et al., 2004) .
Direct empirical tests of these arguments have proven generally problematic as the performance of organizational modes not chosen are not observed (Masten, 1993; Poppo et al., 1998) . Firms' decisions between market and hierarchy result in only one of two possible performance outcomes, raising the question of how to estimate performance differences between the organizational mode selected and the counterfactual . This paper instead examines the effects of several knowledge-based attributes on the performance of both market and hierarchies. Similar to Leiblein, Reuer et al. (2002) and Macher (2004) , we compare performance using direct measures that represent important dimensions of competitiveness using the pharmaceutical industry as our empirical setting. As the good being transferred is entirely knowledge-based, the empirical analysis represents an ideal setting in which to add to the KBV by highlighting the performance implications of governance choice. A model similar to that of Masten et al. (1991) and Poppo and Zenger (1998) is used, whereby a vector of attributes determines organization and performance.
Knowledge and Experience
We first build upon a distinction in the knowledge-based view between two classes of knowledge: localized (or internal) experience and integrative (or external) experience. The former represents firms' abilities to develop internally-based sources of knowledge, while the latter represents firms' abilities to integrate and exploit internal and external sources of knowledge. This distinction between is found in Yeoh and Roth (1999) , and is also at the heart of Henderson and Cockburn's (1994a) discussion of architectural and component competencies. Teece et al. (1997) also draw on this distinction in their discussion of competencies and dynamic capabilities. Finally, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) highlight the relationship between firms' existing stock of knowledge and their abilities to integrate new knowledge and transfer knowledge across organizational boundaries.
An understanding of this distinction is useful in several respects. Localized experience is important in industries in which highly tacit knowledge, skills and proprietary technologies are important determinants of firm performance (Leonard-Barton 1992; Henderson and Cockburn 1994; Teece and Sullivan 1994) . By contrast, i ntegrative experience is an important source of competitive advantage in industries that rely heavily on external institutions in the innovative process (Nelson 1991; LeonardBarton 1992; Henderson and Cockburn 1994) , or where firms have to integrate knowledge across organizational boundaries (Henderson and Clark 1990; Henderson 1994; Henderson and Cockburn 1994) .
A large and growing body of research in the KBV suggests that localized experience is an important source of competitive advantage. Organizations are often described as routine-based and history-dependent systems that adapt incrementally to past experiences (March & Simon, 1958) .
Organizational capability grows as experiential learning accumulates from established routines (Nelson et al., 1982) and localized firm knowledge and expertise (Leonard-Barton, 1992) , but also depends critically on firms' abilities to integrate knowledge within the firm (Grant, 1996a) . Deeply embedded organizational routines both enable and constrain what firms can do (Baum et al., 2000) . Furthermore, because experiential learning is based on highly tacit knowledge it is not only largely immobile and difficult for other firms to easily acquire or imitate (Teece, 1982) , but also highly specific to product, technological or functional areas.
If experiential learning provides informational advantages or gains via the perceived legitimacy (March, 1988) or past success (Baum et al., 2000) of repetition, or the accompanying reduction in uncertainty from learning by doing (Argote, 1999) , it should be reflected in superior performance. By contrast, firms relatively inexperienced to specific areas are unlikely to have detailed information filters or developed heuristics in place for effective decision making and problem solving. Research that examines firm experience has been largely supportive of these claims, including studies in populations of commercial banks (Pennings & Harianto, 1992) , investment banks (Podolny, 1994) and acquiring firms (Haleblian & Finklestein, 1999) ; technological choices among firms (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Stuart & Podolny, 1996) ; and foreign market entry (Henisz & Macher, 2004; Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1992) , among others.
Performance in development likely improves from knowledge competence developed via learning economies. Greater experience not only deepens knowledge related to particular technological areas, but also facilitates the creation of common knowledge and understanding within the firm (Grant, 1996b ). The development of detailed i nformation filters, improvements in shared understanding and more focused problem solving strategies brought on by greater experience should improve development performance.
We therefore examine the following hypothesis:
Firms with greater localized experience achieve superior development performance, ceteris paribus.
External experience represents the abilities of organizations to make use of their localized knowledge competencies and integrate them in new ways, often by accessing knowledge outside of their organizational boundaries. This definition points to the competitive importance of firms' communication channels, managerial systems, and problem-solving strategies in acquiring outside knowledge and effectively integrating and exploiting this knowledge (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Kogut et al., 1992; Leonard-Barton, 1992) . Henderson and Cockburn (1994) suggest that firms' abilities to maintain flows of knowledge across boundaries is an important factor in explaining research productivity. Kogut and Zander (1992) similarly suggest that the ability to redeploy firms' existing knowledge bases is a critical firm competence. Several other scholars also suggest that in science-driven industries, the most productive organizations are those that are able to acquire and exploit knowledge from external sources, which is consistent with a broader literature on the importance of outside sources of knowledge in innovative performance (Mueller 1962; Von Hippel 1988; Griliches 1991) .
Firms wit h strong links to external scientific networks likely have superior absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) vis-à-vis their peers. These firms are better able to monitor important changes and understand where important comple mentary expertise may or may not reside (Von Hippel 1988) . In addition to being able to recognize the value of and utilize external knowledge, firms must also be able to internalize this relevant knowledge. A second important dimension of integrative experience therefore relates firms' abilit ies to access and transfer knowledge and information across organizational boundaries.
Some researchers emphasize the role of boundary-spanning personnel (e.g., gatekeepers) in facilitating knowledge transfer (Cohen et al., 1990) , but the problem of transferring knowledge across organizational boundaries has broader implications that just the division of innovative labor among firms. Integrative competence also captures the connections to important entities that firms establish who can potentially influence or improve development performance. We examine the following hypothesis:
H2: Firms with greater integrative experience achieve superior development performance, ceteris paribus.
Knowledge Complexity and Organization
As described above, t echnological development requires the solving of different kinds of problems utilizing resources both within and outside of the firm. And a variety of factors influence how firms approach and solve technological development problems, including their current knowledge and capabilities, past experiences, and idiosyncratic constraints. Some researchers instead suggest that how firms organize innovative activities is related the nature of the technology involved, including but not limited to its novelty or complexity (Mowery, 1983; Pisano, 1990; Teece, 1986) .
Hierarchies are likely advantaged for more novel (e.g., more complex or more leading-edge) technological development in comparison to market modes of organization because they better facilitate the generation of new knowledge and aid in its efficient dissemination through the formation of firmspecific languages and communication codes (Demsetz, 1988; Kogut et al., 1996; Monteverde, 1995) .
Hierarchies also possess superior adaptive features in comparison to market modes, helping to facilitate the speed and effectiveness with which change can be implemented. Support for this technological complexity and coordination argument has been found in several studies of technological development, including the R&D requirements between Canadian telecommunications carriers with their suppliers (Globerman, 1980) , the design of new aerospace components between successive stages of production (Masten, 1984) , and the organization and performance of semiconductor process development (Leiblein et al., 2002; Macher, 2004) , among other studies. Hierarchies also provide superior administrative controls for guiding technological development in comparison to market modes of organization. Problems at the technological frontier often cannot be subdivided into distinct parts because of the unexpected (and sometimes unknown) interactions between and among knowledge sets (Levinthal, 1997) . The greater authority of hierarchy facilitates communication and coordination between stages of development so that decisions are based upon convergent expectations (Malmgren, 1961) . Hierarchy also allows adaptation to take place in a sequential fashion as events unfold or new information is revealed (Masten, 1984;  Willia mson, 1985)-a scenario increasingly likely when technological development is more novel . The sharing of technological information common to stages of development is also easier under common ownership, as are the formulation of R&D goals and the definition of research agendas (Armour & Teece, 1980) . Because the administrative control structures and low powered incentives support the adaptive, sequential and interrelated changes that are needed, hierarchies should be able to solve the associated problems more effectively in comparison to the market.
By contrast, superior performance is likely realized with less novel (e.g., less complex or more trailing-edge) technological development when organized via the market. The requirements for coordination between economic actors are reduced for less novel technological development as pertinent information is either better understood or codified from its diffusion into the public domain. Significant administrative control for guiding technolo gical development is also not as stringent a requirement. The associated p roblems can more easily be subdivided, which helps facilitate the speed with which appropriate solutions can be found via entities operating individually and under market-based incentives.
Due to their high-powered incentives, decentralized decision-making properties, and abilities to quickly induce and react to change, market modes represent the better organizational approach for less novel technological development. Hierarchies are comparatively disadvantaged, due to their low-powered incentives and more bureaucratic features which slow the speed with which potential solutions can be examined, chosen and implemented.
Greater novelty is not surprisingly expected to create managerial difficulties and have performance implications with organizing technological development both administratively within firms and contractually between them. But b ecause hierarchies are better able to adapt to changing circumstances in a sequential fashion as they unfold and new information is revealed, the adverse performance effects of greater novelty should be smaller in hierarchies in comparison to market modes.
Accordingly, we examine following set of hypotheses:
H3A: Development that is more technologically novel worsens performance, ceteris paribus.
H3B: Hierarchies (market modes of organization) achieve superior performance for development that is more (less) technologically novel vis-à-vis the market (hierarchies).
EMPIRICAL SETTING

Pharmaceutical Drug Development
There are two main activities in bringing a new drug product to market in the pharmaceuticals industry.
The first set of activities-commonly referred to as drug discovery-involves the initial screening and extraction of a compound with certain desired therapeutic properties. Once a new compound has been "discovered," a second set of development-oriented activities that involve extensive laboratory, animal and human testing and considerable regulatory oversight begins. Although four main phases of drug development are applied to virtually every new drug product, the specific activities undertaken in each vary considerably by product. The preclinical phase includes the development of basic drug profiles, pharmacologic tests to define mechanism of action and dose response, and toxicological tests to determine harmful effects of dosage levels typically in animals. Phase 1 clinical activities include the cautious administration of the drug to a small number of healthy human patients to determine the metabolism and pharmacologic action of the drug and to demonstrate and assess clinical safety. Phase 2 clinical activities include the administration of the drug to a small sample of human patients actually suffering from the disease or ailment that the drug is meant to address to determine appropriate dosage and regimen, and evaluate effectiveness with respect to key clinical endpoints. Phase 3 clinical activities include evaluations of the overall benefit/risk of the drug on a larger and representative human patient population in several testing centers in multiple countries to identify adverse reactions, determine appropriate dosage levels and further demonstrate product safety and efficacy.
While the basic structure outlined above is applied to virtually every new drug product in the U.S., the specific activities undertaken in each of these phases vary considerably. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations covering new drug development leave most of the key decisions regarding how to proceed in the hands of the sponsoring firm (O. T.A. 1984) . Rather than providing a recipe for new product development, the FDA specifies a series of hurdles that pharmaceutical firms must clear in order to gain approval. The most important concerns to FDA regulators are ensuring that sponsor firms develop accurate drug profiles (i.e., basic activity, dose response, mechanism of action, etc.); prove drug safety and effectiveness; and safely manufacture the compound while preserving drug composition and stability.
Until relatively recently, close linkages have existed between drug discovery and drug development. The process of discovering new drug compounds was effectively a quasi-random screening process in which a large number of natural and chemically derived compounds were randomly tested in laboratory and animal models for potential therapeutic activity. Scientists lacked a well-developed corpus of knowledge regarding the biological underpinnings of specific disease and therefore were forced to rely more on observation than established theory in designing new drugs. Over the last 25 years, however, advances in the fields of physiology, pharmacology, enzymology, and cell bio logy have provided better understanding of the "mechanisms of action" of many drug compounds , as well as facilitated the drug discovery process itself by allowing researchers to more carefully screen, select, and test a wider range of drug compounds. Over the same time period, the rise of biotechnology has created new opportunities for pharmaceutical and biomedical research (Malerba & Orsenigo, 2001 ).
The combined effect of these advances has given rise to what is commonly known as "rational drug design," or the application of biomedical knowledge to the design of new compounds and the ways in which these new compounds are tested (Cockburn & Henderson, 1999; Malerba et al., 2001 ). These advances have reduced the degree of uncertainty involved with drug research and have allowed scientists to better design target compounds through more established scientific theory (Arora & Gambardella, 1994) , thereby decreasing the centrality of subsequent in vitro and in vivo testing to the discovery process.
Biomedical advances that have been made have helped to decouple organizational capabilities that underlie drug discovery from those required in drug development (Arora et al., 1994) . The effective separation of the skills has subsequently led to an increase in the number of specialized Contract Research
Organizations (CROs) who have come to represent an important part of pharmaceutical drug development. Since the early 1980s, an estimated one-third of industry R&D spending on clinical trials is now conducted by such independent organizations (CMR_International, 1999).
Drug development is fundamentally a planning exercise whereby information obtained in one stage must be reviewed and analyzed to determine how best to proceed in terms of allocating resources in subsequent stages over multiple years and involving multiple organizations (Spilker, 1989) . Because development approaches vary significantly according to the therapeutic characteristics of the drug, experience in specific technological areas matters. The difficulties associated with development of new drug protocols suggest that localized knowledge bases within specific technological areas may provide performance benefits. In addition to the internal expertise that results from experience, many pharmaceutical firms rely on the knowledge and skills of various external partners to better manage drug development uncertainty. By establishing ties with a cademic and contract research organizations, pharmaceutical firms are able to not only access specialized expertise, but also monitor important scientific and technological breakthroughs. Access to these kinds of knowledge allows many pharmaceutical firms to better design and, when conditions warrant, redesign drug testing procedures. In addition to uncertainty, drug development entails a series of highly technical and complex activities, requiring firms to integrate local and external expertise in various functional areas (Mathieu 1997).
Access to a pool of trained specialists in various functional areas is essential to effectively designing and executing clinical and non-clinical testing. In addition to integrating this disciplinary expertise, firms must also understand the nuances associated with developing different types of drugs. The complexities associated with developing drugs vary significantly by therapeutic category. Again, many firms rely on their internal experience, as well as the expertise of clinicians at academic medical schools and contract research organizations.
The importance of having access to both internal and external sources of knowledge is heig htened by the inability of the FDA to provide detailed guidelines to sponsoring firms on key aspects of drug development. While the FDA has issued scores of useful formal and informal guidance documents, these publications mainly represent the agency's current thoughts regarding the nature and variety of information that may be useful to reviewers in determining the merits of a new drug product (OTA 1993).
The FDA is quick to point out, however, the limitations of formal guidance on critical aspects of drug testing (Woodcock, 1997 The inability of the FDA to provide guidance to firms on drug development is interesting in light of its strategic importance and the significant resources that firms spend in this area. Firm performance in drug development determines whether a product will be approved for marketing, the indications for which a drug product can be marketed, and importantly, how quickly a new product will get to market. First mover advantages and intense post-patent generic competition give pharmaceutical companies strong incentives to get new drug products to market quickly. Case study evidence suggests that when virtually identical products are brought to market as little as 3-6 months apart, the product appearing first acquires 1 All FDA guidance documents carry with them the caveat that they are not legally binding and following the suggested guidelines in no way guarantees a favorable outcome OTA (1993 Delays in development effectively shorten this profitability window.
The importance of drug development is also reflected in the significant time and resources that firms invest in development activities. Roughly 60% of company-financed R&D is expended on preclinical and clinical testing and regulatory approval efforts (PhRMA 1999). Clinical development and approval phase activities alone account for roughly 50% of the time required to bring a new drug product to market. Moreover, the time and costs required to complete clinical development activities have been increasing steadily in recent years (PhRMA 1999) . The increases in development time and cost reflect added regulatory requirements, the increasing complexity and scope of research that is required, the use of newer and more expensive technologies, and a refocusing of development on the treatment of chronic and degenerative diseases, which typically require longer and more expensive testing.
Finally, performance in drug development has important implications for pharmaceutical industry structure. The pharmaceutical industry has witnessed increased vertical specialization since the mid1970s. Dozens of new firms have been formed to pursue commercial R&D opportunities spawned by advances in biotechnology. While a handful of these firms possess a full range of discovery and development capabilities, most focus on basic research and contract for development with larger, more established pharmaceutical firms who possess the downstream clinical development, regulatory and marketing capabilities needed to bring new drug products to market (Spilker 1989) . At the same time, the increasingly specialized nature of development activities has given rise to a large and growing market of CROs (Azoulay, 2004; Macher & Boerner, 2004) . While outsourcing to contract researchers is not a new phenomenon in pharmaceuticals, these organizations were initially used sparingly and mainly to cover gaps in capacity. CROs now cover all areas of R&D, from discovery and early phase development to post-approval marketing. As CROs have become more specialized in specific therapeutic and disease categories, their performance in these areas have come to rival those of established pharmaceutical firms (Miller and Pryce, 1999) . The use of CROs to perform various development activities is now an important component of development strategies for both biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms.
DATA AND MEASURES
Data Sources
Data for this paper were obtained from several sources. Performance measures were obtained from the 
Performance Measures
Superior performance is ultimately measured through the competitive standing of the firm as demonstrated in its revenue, profitability, market share, or market value. But the use of such measures to explore performance in pharmaceutical drug development is somewhat problematic , however. Drug development is an inherently long process, making it difficult to determine the effect of any one development phase on the performance measures noted above. Moreover, performance measures such as revenue and profitability are misleading in pharmaceuticals since they often are skewed toward a small number of "blockbuster" drugs that dominate the portfolios of many pharmaceutical firms.
Similar to Cockburn and Henderson (2001) Merging these two data sources provides the exact calendar time when an IND application was filed by the pharmaceutical firm, when the corresponding NDA was submitted to the FDA, and when the NDA was approved by the FDA. We focus our analysis on the time between IND submission and NDA submission, as this time is under the direct influence of pharmaceutical firms, whereas NDA submission to approval time is determined in part by the actions of the FDA.
Independent Variables
The existing pharmacoeconomics literature points to several drug-level characteristics that explain development performance. Dronove and Meltzer (1994) suggest that the importance of a new drug product as determined by the FDA's priority rating determines how approval time. Drugs which are categorized by the FDA as therapeutically novel receive quicker review than drugs which are viewed as less innovative. Kaitin et al. (1994) similarly relate clinical drug development time to therapeutic novelty.
More scientifically novel drug products realize longer approval times, while the opposite is true for less novel drugs. Kaitin et al. (1997) find that drug approval times vary by therapeutic class. Drugs for chronic 3 It excludes biologics, vaccines and diagnostic agents. New salts, esters and dosage forms of previously approved compounds are also excluded.
illnesses typically take longer to approve than do drugs for acute illnesses due to the added complexity associated with testing drugs the former.
Relatively little research examines the importance of firm-level factors, such as knowledge competencies or development organization, in determining drug development performance. Olson (1997) does examines how certain firm characteristics affect FDA approvals, but the focus is on how firm characteristics provide a signal of firm reputation or quality to FDA reviewers and impact bureaucratic decision-making within the agency. While a signaling approach may provide insights into the behavior of FDA reviewers, it ignores the possibility that certain firms are more adept at managing FDA approvals than are others. Some research finds evidence of the importance of scale economies (Danzon et al., 2004) and scope economies via knowledge spillovers in drug development performance (Cockburn et al., 2001 ).
We add to this research stream by examining a complementary set of firm-and drug-level factors which we argue influences performance.
Knowledge Experience Measures
Localized Experience -There are multiple areas in which firms may develop strategically important localized experience in drug development. A review of the pharmacoeconomics literature and discussions with industry practitioners highlight the importance of two factors that relate to firms' experience in clinical development. Because clinical development approaches vary significantly by the therapeutic characteristics of the drug, firms' prior experience in the same therapeutic area may be an important determinant of subsequent performance. As firms become more experienced in particular therapeutic areas, they acquire localized expertise and develop problem-solving strategies that can be drawn on in subsequent and similar efforts. Experience might also improve relationships with important constituents, such as clinicians, patient populations and regulators (Danzon et al., 2004) . The existence of an established knowledge base in a given technological area, as well as established routines for handling similar types of problems (Nelson et al., 1982) , partially explains why some firms have acquired strong reputations for developing drugs in particular therapeutic areas.
Drug development has a fairly standard taxonomy into which drug products can be assigned via major therapeutic areas (e.g., cardiovascular, oncology, central nervous system, etc. 
where TA_EXP i,j,t represents the summation of prior successful drug development projects by pharmaceutical firm i in therapeutic category j at time t, and TA i,j,t represents a count of successful drug development projects for pharmaceutical firm i in therapeutic category j at time t. The depreciation factor (δ) allows recent experience to be weighted more heavily than past experience, which is consistent with the notion of organizational forgetting (Argote, 1999; Benkard, 1999) . We depreciate Therapeutic Area
Experience by twenty percent per period in the econometric analysis. We varied this factor from ten to forty percent per period to test its robustness and confirm no significant changes in the econometric results obtain.
where TOT_EXP i,t and TOT i,,t are defined similarly to the variables above, but over all therapeutic categories. We use similarly a twenty per cent depreciation factor per period for Total Experience.
Integrative Experience -Within the pharmaceutical industry, several external sources of knowledge may have important effects on drug development performance, most notably research-oriented academic medic al schools (Gambardella 1995; Mathieu 1997) and contract research organizations. An association with these organizations provides two main development-related benefits for pharmaceutical firms. First, research-oriented academic medical schools and CROs provide access to therapeutic and clinical expertise that may prove beneficial to firms' current and future drug development efforts. Academic clinicians are most likely to keep abreast of advances in medical technologies that can then be brought to bear on the design of the clinical trials associated with a given drug product. These institutions also typically possess the range of functional expertise necessary to design and execute the battery of clinical development tasks required and typic ally have specialized therapeutic area experience beneficial to a specific drug product. Second, these institutions allows firms to better monitor changes in medical technology that may affect the development of a given drug product or alter the criteria by which it will be evaluated by FDA.
To explore the extent to which pharmaceutical firms are externally linked and active in the broader scientific network we utilize two measures. The variable Research Centers captures the number of linkages between a given firm and major research medical centers, where a "major" research medical center is defined as one of the top 100 research institutions ranked in terms of research funding provided by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1990. We construct this variable by summing the number of previously approved drug products that employed one of these top research centers. The variable CRO tests the influence of firms' associations with CROs that have specialized experience in a related therapeutic areas. The variable is coded 1 if the focal pharmaceutical firm utilized at least one CRO in the development of a given drug product, and 0 otherwise.
Knowledge Complexity Measures
The complexity of a given drug development effort is proxied for by two variables. Drug Novelty is a measure of the extent to which a drug development project relies on prevailing scientific knowledge. For each drug development project, this variable is coded relative to the number of other drug products that were successful in clinical trials and subsequent commercialization and with the same mechanism of action and therapeutic area. With less pre-existing knowledge regarding the therapeutic characteristics of more novel drug products, pharmaceutical firms must expend extra effort profiling and exploring clinical effects, ceteris paribus. The variable is coded 1 if development for the given drug product requires more novel scientific knowledge (less number of clinically approved and commercialized drug products), and 0 otherwise. The priority of a given drug product also affects the complexity of development. Priority drugs are given greater attention by FDA reviewers, and at least in theory, are subject to expedited review, while s tandard drugs receive no special consideration. Consistent w ith previous research (Kaitin, Manocchia et al. 1994 ; Olson 1997), we categorize drug products originally labeled by FDA as 1P, 1A, 1AA, and 1B as "priority" drugs, and drugs originally labeled by FDA as 1C or 1S as "standard."
5 Drug
Priority is coded 1 if the given drug product has a priority rating, and 0 otherwise.
We also include the interaction of drug novelty and pharmaceutical firms' therapeutic area experience. This measure might have important performance implications, especially in relation to the outsourcing of drug development to CROs. Development for m ore novel drugs might benefit from internal organization due to its superior coordinative features, while development for less novel drugs might benefit from outsourcing due to the high-powered incentives of the CRO market. Pharmaceutical firms' own experience within the therapeutic area, however, likely conditions not only the outsourcing decision but also the subsequent performance.
5
The FDA began classifying all commercially sponsored INDs by therapeutic potential in 1976. New Chemical Entities (NCEs) with potentially important therapeutic gains were rated 1A, those with moderate gains were rated 1B, while those with little therapeutic gains were labeled 1C. FDA later added the 1AA classification for all drugs designed to treat AIDS and AIDS-related conditions. This labeling system was changed yet again in 1992 as a result of recommendations from the Council on Competitiveness. The FDA replaced the AA, A,B,C rating system with a simplified classification system of P (priority) and S (standard).
Control Measures
We include several general firm-and drug-level control variables that likely influence the speed with which drug development projects move from IND application to NDA submission.
Firm Characteristics -Larger firms may face a degree of institutional insulation and bureaucratization that decreases responsiveness to shifting industry conditions (Haveman, 1993) . At the same time, larger firms may possess superior financial or human resource endowments that allow them to more readily invest in new technologies, or enjoy greater market power or positional advantages that affects their incentives and improves their abilities to adapt to changing environmental conditions (Baum & Mezias, 1992; Baum & Oliver, 1991) . A number of variables have been used to measure firm size in the managerial literature; we examine three in particular. The variable Pharmaceutical Sales represents the pharmaceutical revenue achieved by the firm in the year prior to the start of drug development. The variable Pharmaceutical R&D represents the pharmaceutical R&D expenditures by the firm in the year prior to the start of drug development. Finally, the variable Pharmaceutical R&D Stock converts the R&D expenditure measure to an R&D stock measure. Firm age may also influence firms' organization decisions and subsequent performance. In particular, the liability of newness suggests that older firms benefit from accumulated experience (Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Carroll & Hannan, 2000) , whereas the liability of senescence suggests firms increasingly become ossified as they age (Barnett, 1990; Carroll et al., 2000) . The variable Firm Age measures the number of years since firm founding.
We utilize two variables to gauge the experience of the firm in activities outside of, but not necessarily related to drug development. The variable Licensing Experience is a measure of the number of drug compounds that the focal firm has licensed in (as opposed to internally developed) for drug development. The intent of this variable is to control for the experience and level of "comfort" that pharmaceutical firms have in outsourcing activities in general, but separate from drug development. The variable Clinical Patents measures the number of clinical patents achieved by the pharmaceutical firm in the 5 years prior to a drug entering development divided by the firm's R&D stock at that time. This variable is intended to control for the intellectual capital of pharmaceutic al firms while separating the effects of localized experience from some other knowledge-based measure that may explain performance.
Drug Development Characteristics -The variable
License is an indictor variable that determines whether the focal drug product under development was discovered internally or licensed in by the focal pharmaceutical firm. This variable is intended to partially control for whether the skills associated with drug discovery are different from the skills associated with drug development. The variable Market Size is a proxy for the size of the market for which the new drug product is targeted. Drugs that are targeted to a large group of diverse patients usually entail additional and more complex testing than drugs that are targeted to smaller, more homogeneous patient populations.
Indicator Variables -We control for unobserved time-varying factors that influence firms' development performance by introducing a yearly time trend. Pharmaceutical firms in our sample have successfully completed slightly more than one drug development project in a given therapeutic area and more than six across all therapeutic areas on average.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Summary Statistics
Maximum values of 7 and 18 for therapeutic area and total experience, respectively, indicate that some pharmaceutical firms have significant experience in successfully getting drug products through the development process. More than two-thirds of the drug development projects in the sample utilize CROs for d rug development. Roughly one-third of the drug development projects in the sample are scientifically-novel, while slightly less than half have high priority status.
There is significant pair-wise significance in our dependent variable measures and several of our independent variables. In particular, the negative and significant pair-wise correlations between IND Time and the knowledge experience variables suggest that these variables may be good predictors of drug development performance. Our measures of firm size are highly correlated with each other, however, which present multicollinearity concerns and require consideration for identification purposes in the econometric analysis. A variance inflation factor (VIF) test confirms harmful multicollinearity among these variables. Since variables based on assets or employees are directly dependent upon the decision to internalize development activities, we utilize Pharmaceutical Sales as our preferred measure of firm size, but test for the effects of the other size-related variables in the robustness analysis.
Econometric Model
Because we examine drug development completion time, we implement event history analysis. Each drug development project is considered to be at risk until it is completed. We model this as a stochastic process, defining the transition rate r(t) of development completion for pharmaceutical firm i at time t as:
We estimate models that specify the transition rate as a function of time t and a vector of covariates Z that measures experience, complexity and our control variables. This estimation approach takes the general
Our specific approach is a piecewise constant rate model that takes the form
, where Z it represents the covariates and m P denotes a set of durationspecific effects defined by specific breakpoints
This specification produces P distinct periods:
and a set of ordered constant terms m P that indicates whether duration dependence follows any particular pattern. This specification utilizes maximum likelihood estimation that adjusts standard errors for within-firm clustering (by pharmaceutical firm), and is implemented via a user-defined routine in STATA (Sorensen, 1999) . The piecewise exponential specification preserves flexibility without imposing any parametric assumptions or restric tions. Constant hazard rates are defined over P periods, in contrast to the gompertz and weibull distributions which assume a single exponentially increasing (or decreasing) hazard rate and the exponential distribution which assumes a single constant hazard rate .
Biased and inconsistent estimates result when examining drug development performance with simple event history analysis, however, because pharmaceutical firms do not choose to internalize (or outsource) drug development randomly . The use of CROs for drug development is instead chosen systematically by pharmaceutical firms to maximize expected performance. Unobserved factors that influence both the drug development outsourcin g decision and performance create a selfselection bias, and normative implications drawn from these analyses are incorrect. To more accurately specify performance according to outsourcing selection, we employ censored regression models that correct for misspecification in the performance estimation through the addition of a selection equation (Heckman, 1979; Lee, 1982) in particular, one that differentiates internal drug development from outsourced drug development using a vector of exogenous variables. The estimation is carried out using a variant of Heckman's two-step procedure (Heckman, 1979) , with the variable Licensing Experience serving as an instrument for the second stage performance estimation. We argue that this variable affects the choice of organizational form, but does not directly affect firm performance. Licensing experience represents an upstream activity in the discovery and development "value chain" that is strongly associated with firms' outsourcing activities, but should not directly affect performance downstream in drug development.
As our measures represent the hazard of drug development being completed, variables that lead to shorter (longer) drug development times have positive (negative) coefficients. One final econometric issue relates to the bias that is built into the sample of drugs that we examine. There are three main "end" states associated with drug applications: (i) approved, (ii) not approved, and (iii) still in progress. Our data set consists entirely of FDA approved drug products, and as such, does not contain drugs falling into categories (ii) and (iii) above. We do not correct for this bias since our focus is on the firm level factors that drive development times, conditional on drug approval . Table 3 presents the first stage results of the self-selection model, incrementally adding the independent variables of theoretical interest. Each model presented shows the results against the comparison group of internal organization (e.g., no CRO involved in drug development). Model 1 establishes a baseline that includes the firm-level control measures for size (log of pharmaceutical sales revenue), age (log years since founding) and intellectual capital (number of clinical patents divided by R&D stock); a drug-level control measure for whether the focal drug product was licensed in; and a market-level measure for size.
First Stage Selection Results
Model 2 adds the independent variables for knowledge experience and knowledge complexity, while Model 3 adds the instrumental variables. As Model 3 improves the fit in comparison to its predecessors, we focus our attention on it.
The Model 3 results indicate that larger firms are less likely to outsource development to CROs (p<0.10), while older pharmaceutical firms are more likely to (p<0.05). The knowledge stock of the firm and whether the drug was licensed in have no statistically significant effect on development outsourcing decisions, while the size of the market for which the drug product is targeted has a modest effect (p<0.10). In terms of knowledge and experience, greater external experience-measured as the number of established affiliations outside of their own boundaries-negatively influences drug development organizational selection (p<0.01), while internal experience (either localized or general) does not. Both drug novelty and drug priority influence the CRO selection decision and in expected fashions. Drug novelty indicates that pharmaceutical firms are more likely to internalize drug development (p<0.01), while drug priority indicates that firms are more likely to use CROs (p<0.05). These results suggest that pharmaceutical firms recognize the unique communication and coordination requirements of novel drugs and the advantages that internal organization provides in these dimensions. At the same time, high priority drugs suggest using the CRO market where high-powered incentives, decentralized decisionmaking properties, and abilities to quickly change course represents the superior organizational approach.
The interaction of drug novelty with pharmaceutical firms' therapeutic area experience is not significant, but does represent an important determinant of performance (discussed immediately below). Finally, the inclusion of our instrumental variable indicates that the effect of firms with greater licensing experience is as expected but fails to achieve statistical significance. Table 4 presents the second stage performance results, incrementally adding the independent variables of theoretical interest in successive models. Our main performance measure corresponds to the time in months required to move a drug product through clinical trials. The hazard in this case represents a given drug product moving from IND submission to NDA submission. Table 4 presents these results conditional on whether the focal pharmaceutical firm conducted drug development internally (left half of the Table) or outsourced it to CROs (right half of Table) . All of the models presented include a term that corrects for unobserved characteristics that underlie a given outsourcing decision by pharmaceutical firms and its effect on drug development performance. The empirical results in each model are shown with adjusted standard errors via the Huber-White sandwic h estimator and within-firm clustering (by pharmaceutical firm).
Second Stage Performance Results
The first model establishes a baseline that includes firm-level control measures for size, age and intellectual capital; a measure for whether the drug was originally licensed in; a market-level measure for size; and the self-selection correction. Model 2 adds the independent variables for internal and external knowledge experience and knowledge complexity, while Model 3 adds the interaction between drug novelty and pharmaceutical firms' therapeutic area experience. We again focus our discussion of the results using the last model. The significant coefficient estimates for the self-selection correction term in Model 3 indicate that unobserved characteristics underlying CRO selection decisions strongly influence the development performance of those decisions relative to equivalent decisions where internal organization is chosen.
There are thus comparative performance advantages associated with CRO selection (Dolton & Makepeace, 1987; . The results also indicate that several control variables have significant effects on drug development performance. Larger pharmaceutical firms realize performance advantages through internal development (p<0.05) and disadvantages through outsourcing development (p<0.10). Older firms realize performance disadvantages when drug development is conducted internally (p<0.01). Firms' "knowledge stock," measured as the number of clinical -related patents held by pharmaceutical firms divided by R&D stock, significantly improves performance for both internal and outsourced drug development (p<0.01, respectively). Drug products that are licensed in achieve superior performance when development is conducted internally (p<0.01) and worse performance when development is outsourced (p<0.05). These results indicate that firms that outsource both value chain activities (i.e., discovery and development) face a much more difficult task in achieving clinical trial success than outsourcing a single activity (i.e., discovery or development). Finally, the overall size of the market negatively impacts performance for outsourced drug development ( p<0.05), which is consistent with the argument that drugs targeted to a large patient population entail additional testing in comparison to drugs that targeted to smaller patient populations.
In terms of hypothesis testing, we first argue that localized experience positively influences development performance (Hypothesis H1). We find support for this hypothesis for both internal (p<0.01) and outsourced (p<0.05) development using therapeutic area experience, but not for total experience.
There appear to be returns associated with greater experience within particular technological areas, but not in more general experience. We surmise that greater therapeutic area experience provides abundant and useful technological area knowledge via experiential learning by doing (Argote, 1999) . A t-test comparison between the therapeutic area experience coefficients and their standard errors for drug development projects kept internal versus those outsourced to CROs, however, does not demonstrate any statistically significant difference. Taken together, the results provide support for the view that localized experience is an important driver of firm performance in drug development, irrespective of the organizational approach.
We also argue that integrative experience positively influence development performance (Hypothesis H2). Recall that firms which maintain an association with top research-oriented academic medical schools should have greater access to clinical expertise and resources and able to stay abreast of important pharmaceutical developments. Our results provide support for this hypothesis as greater number of research center linkages increases development performance for internal drug development projects kept internal (p<0.01), but has no statistically significant affect on performance for outsourced development. We surmise that linkages to these institutions provide researchers with access to the clinical expertise required to effectively conduct clinical trials, but are (not surprisingly) only useful if and when used by the pharmaceutical firm.
We finally hypothesize that more novel technological development is more difficult (Hypothesis H3A), and that hierarchies are advantaged vis-à-vis markets in these types of development efforts (Hypothesis H3B). We find at least support for both hypotheses. More novel drug development decreases performance for both internal development and outsourced development, but is only significant for outsourced development (p<0.01). Drug priority does not have a significant effect on performance, either for internal or outsourced development. We also examine whether the negative effect of drug novelty on development performance is moderated by greater experience in the technological area. This interaction term is positive and significant for internal drug development efforts (p<0.01), and negative but not significant for outsourced development efforts. Pharmaceutical firms with significant experience within therapeutic areas achieve superior performance for more scientifically novel drug development when conducted internally. A t-test comparison of the coefficients indicates statistically significant differences in effects on performance (p<0.01) between these organizational approaches.
An examination of economic significance helps to better demonstrate the above results. Figure 1 show how therapeutic area experience impacts performance for "regular" versus novel drug products for both internal and outsourced development. This figure normalizes all values by the mean levels of therapeutic area experience for both organizational approaches, so all values in the figure indicate the multiplicative effect of variable changes from this baseline. For regular drug products, greater therapeutic area experience has a positive i mpact on development performance for both internal and outsourced development, but the effect is more acute when CROs are used. This finding suggests that the CRO market is more effective than internal organization for development efforts of "manageable " complexity.
The differences in experience are more profound, however, when drug products are scientifically novel.
Pharmaceutical firms who conduct development internally improve performance roughly nine times from the mean to maximum level of therapeutic area experience, while outsourcing development has a negligible effect on performance as therapeutic area experience increases. This figure clearly indicates the performance penalties associated with outsourcing more complex, leading-edge development for novel drug products versus keeping development internal to the firm.
Discussion
Our empirical findings confirm the effects of localized and integrative experience in differentiating development performance. Greater experience in particular therapeutic areas improves development performance, regardless of whether drug development is kept internal or outsourced to CROs. Greater integrative experience via the number of linkages with academic research centers also has a significant effect on performance. Internal and External experience are thus helpful because they provide additional knowledge that is useful in solving the myriad problems associated with technological development.
Our results also indicate that novelty of technological development and how firms organize for novelty have signific ant performance effects. Pharmaceutical firms that outsource development for "regular" drug products and keep internal more novel drug products outperform those firms that do the exact opposite. Because the knowledge and scientific understand surrounding novel drug products is less established, a higher degree of coordination is likely required among and between technological activities in order to solve problems associated with more novel scientifically development, which is more easily facilitated within a given firm than between firms. This result suggests firms should appropriately align the organization of development with the particular technological requirements not only to facilitate problem identification and solution but also to achieve superior performance.
Our analysis has obvious implications for firms competing in the pharmaceutical industry. As pharmaceutical firms allocate a significant amount of resources to drug development activities, how well they organize these activities has a substantial impact on whether and when a new drug product will reach the market and, if so, the size of the economic returns achieved. We believe our results have important implications beyond pharmaceuticals, however, and are relevant to managers and firms engaged in the production of knowledge related to technological development within or outside of the boundaries of the firm where firms make different, but related products; where experience increases knowledge and improves performance; and where technological complexity varies across products or processes. Other relevant industry examples are likely to include, but not be limited to chemicals, consumer electronics, semiconductor products, and software.
Our results confirm that development performance i s conditioned by a give and take between localized experience and scientific novelty. Firms with more experience in a particular technological area should maintain an internal development posture, but focus on the most complex development and outsource otherwise. An important question then is why firms make such apparent organizational mistakes in regard to technological development. We believe ( and our interviews with industry practitioners confirm) that pharmaceutical firms are not strategic in their approaches toward drug development. Instead of considering the entire portfolio of drug products under development now and in the future (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992) , firms myopically and almost automatically assign internal development resources (when available) to the next drug product, irrespective of its technological requirements. Only when drug development capacity constraints become acute are the hard choices associated with outsourcing development considered. Our analysis instead suggests that firms must balance their drug development portfolios and maintain some amount of resource slack according to the technological requirements of the drug products currently in development and in the future. Some limitations and caveats must be noted in our empirical analysis and the results described above. We examine development in a single industry, pharmaceuticals. Within this setting, we further limit our examination to a set of clinical-related activities that we are able to generate good proxies for.
Although a narrow focus potentially limits the generalizability of our results, it nevertheless allows for greater precision in our measures and a more direct link between the presence of these factors and differences in firm performance. Due to data limitations we consider only new drug products that were ultimately approved by the FDA. A more complete picture of the firm-and technological -level factors underlying successful development requires consideratio n of successes and failures. All of our results are also subject to the qualification that drug development time is but one measure of performance in the pharmaceutical industry.
One additional qualification centers on the relationship between drug discovery and drug development. As described above, the skills required for drug development differ in important ways from those required for discovery. Important feedback loops remain, however, between these two stages of innovation. While the discovery process is more reliant on general biopharmaceutical knowledge, it remains an empirical process that has close ties to development. Moreover, the speed and efficiency with which drugs move through development depend in part on the quality of the compounds coming out of discovery. In other words, superior drug development performance may at least partially reflect firm expertise in discovering better quality candidate compounds. What is therefore required is somehow isolating the influence of the skills in drug discovery from those in development. As a first step, we control for whether a given drug product was developed internally or licensed to the development sponsor by other bio pharmaceutical firms. While this represents an imperfect measure since it may be the case that some firms are more skilled at selecting candidate drugs for licensing than are other firms , it does provide greater confidence in our results.
CONCLUSION
Relying on the comparative approach of transaction cost economics (TCE) and the developing knowledge-based view (KBV) of the boundary decision, this paper provides a detailed examination of knowledge and organization in an R&D-intensive setting. Our empirical results underscore the importance of both knowledge and organization in solving different types of problems related to technological development. Firm-level internal and external experience and technological complexity explain performance differences between firms. The way in which firms organize for this complexity also influences performance, as i t either facilitates or hinders problem solving abilities and the time to resolution.
Our findings have important implications for firms involved in development where close coordination and the sharing of information are essential . Such a scenario is more when the science underlying a new product or process is highly novel or the development tasks associated with it are complex. Our empirical analysis also provides a number of new insights into the importance and interaction of firm experience and novelty in technological development and how they relate to organization. The paper thus adds to literature that examines organization and performance in an R&D-intensive setting.
The importance of effective knowledge development is magnified in light of the vertical specialization seen in the pharmaceuticals industry. With more firms outsourcing development activities to Contract Research Organizations (CROs), we find that these organizational decisions have important performance implications. Outsourcing development activities may lead to inferior performance (relative to internal development) when the product is highly complex or close to the technological frontier and the underlying body of science is poorly understood. 
KNOWLEDGE COMPETENCE
TA Experience
Discounted prior experience in a therapeutic area of focal pharmaceutical firm
TOT Experience
Discounted prior experience across all therapeutic areas of focal pharmaceutical firm
Research Centers
Number of linkages between focal pharmaceutical firm and academic research institutions as defined by public research dollar allocation CRO Indicator of whether CROs were involved in drug development with focal pharmaceutical firm
KNOWLEDGE COMPLEXITY Drug Novelty
Novelty of a given drug according to its reliance on prevailing scientific knowledge Drug Priority Priority rating of a given drug by the FDA
CONTROLS
Pharmaceutical Sales
Pharmaceutical sales of focal pharmaceutical firm in the year prior to the start of drug development for a given drug product
Pharmaceutical R&D
Pharmaceutical R&D expenditures of focal pharmaceutical firm in the year prior to the start of drug development for a given drug product
Pharmaceutical R&D Stock
Stock of pharmaceutical R&D of focal pharmaceutical firm in the year prior to the start of drug development for a given drug product
Firm Age
Number of years since focal pharmaceutical firm founding
Clinical Patents
The number of clinical patents of focal pharmaceutical firm in the 5 years prior to drug development divided by the firm's R&D stock at that time License Indicator of whether focal drug product was developed internally or licensed in
Market Size
Proxy for the size of the market for which the drug product is targeted 
